

**SECRET**

REGISTRY  
FILE 04112-1

DD/S 79-0022

24 JUL 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications  
Director of Finance  
Director of Logistics  
Director of Medical Services  
Director of Personnel  
Director of Security

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Survey of the Office of  
Computer Services

REFERENCE : Memo from DD/S to Addressees dtd 18 June 70,  
Same Subject

1. There is attached an extract of the memorandum to the Executive Director-Comptroller in response to the recommendation in the Inspector General's Survey of OCS which concerns the counseling of DD/S detailees assigned to the SIPS Task Force. This response takes into consideration the comments on this subject which each of you prepared.

2. You are probably aware that we have begun a study of the professional development of Support Services personnel who are engaged in information processing activities; this study should assist in resolving some of the more basic problems. As indicated in the reference, we will be in touch with you further on this subject and as the results of the study are in hand. Meanwhile, as indicated in the response to the Inspector General's recommendation, counseling of individual detailees to the SIPS Task Force from each of your career services should continue.

SIGNED R. L. Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

cc: Chief, Support Services Staff

Attachment

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DD/S 70-2976

22 JUL 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

EXTRACT

"Recommendation No. 3

That the Director of the SIPS Task Force and the heads of the DDS Career Services concerned arrange for counseling with each DDS detailee with a view to assuring the best possible long-range utilization of the individual, both from his standpoint and that of the Agency.

Action or Comment

Concur in principle, but we believe the specific action recommended has to be taken in consideration of the circumstances which apply in individual cases and their relationships to the particular career services concerned. Conversation with one of the inspectors who conducted the survey indicates that the intent of the recommendation was to have the Director of the SIPS Task Force participate with the head of each Support Career Service in a discussion with members of their career services in groups to give assurances of long term career interest. The managers of the Task Force and the heads of the Support Career Services have been keenly aware of the problems and concerns of the individuals assigned from the Support offices since the beginning of the project. The manner in which the people were assembled--first as a committee, then as full-time details and latterly by transfers of positions to the Support Services Staff--is fraught with potential morale problems. While regularly scheduled interviews and discussions with individual employees either by Task Force management or heads of Support Career Services have not been held, each person assigned to the Task Force has had more than one discussion of this kind. Although each has been given the assurances recommended, I do not believe that repeating the process would make such assurances more acceptable now than they have been in the past.

Hybrid organizations composed of combinations of people representing different Directorates have an inherent potential for generating problems and criticisms of the kind identified in this report. In this instance, personnel of the Support Career Services are doing the same work side by side with

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X1 people from the Office of Computer Services, but competitive evaluation for promotion is handled by separate mechanisms. Average salary and headroom constraints are quite different and general criteria for advancement bear little resemblance between the Support Career Services and the "R" career service of which the OCS employees are members. That these variables exist to some degree among the several Support career services also compounds the difficulties. We believe that the problem is more fundamental than one which may be correctable by counseling alone. It relates to the general lack of definition of career service mechanisms for people engaged in the information processing professions. Accordingly, we have initiated a study of these problems at the Directorate level with the assistance of a consultant from [redacted] Meanwhile, counseling with individual employees will continue."

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Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R003400080042-3

FILE

DD/S 70-2271  
18 JUN 1970  
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DD/S 70-2271

18 JUN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications  
Director of Finance  
Director of Logistics  
Director of Medical Services  
Director of Personnel  
Director of Security

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Survey of the Office of  
Computer Services

1. Attached is an extract from subject survey concerning Recommendation No. 3:

"That the Director of the SIPS Task Force and the heads of the DDS Career Services concerned arrange for counseling with each DDS detailee with a view to assuring the best possible long-range utilization of the individual, both from his standpoint and that of the Agency."

2. Prior to any counseling sessions with your careerists, concerning which we will be in further communication, I would appreciate your advising by 1 July 1970 the manner in which you are handling your careerists who are assigned to the SIPS Task Force — frequency and level of contact, career counseling and planning with them, competitive promotion discussions, continuing identification with parent office/career service, etc.

3. The Executive Director-Comptroller has requested a reply on this recommendation by mid-July.

SIGNED R. L. Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

Att

SOS-DD/S: [ ] ng (15 June 70)

Rewritten: ADD/S:JWC/ms (18 June 70)

Distribution:

Orig - D/CO, w/Att

1 - Chief, SSS, w/Att

1 - DD/S Subject, w/Att & Background

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1 - SOS Chrono, w/Att

1 - DD/S Chrono

S E C R E T

20. Discussions with SIPS Employees - We received a variety of reactions and opinions in talking with the OCS and DDS employees working on the SIPS Program. The group leaders and branch chiefs seemed encouraged by the progress being made since the formation of the Task Force. They were cautiously optimistic about future progress and felt that present target dates for implementation of the major systems could be met, provided continued access to high levels of DDS management could be maintained to ensure timely decisions in respect to users' final systems design requirements.

21. Although most of the SIPS employees were very critical of the way in which the program had been managed in the past, they seemed to feel that the present "mix" of skills and talents has improved the quality of analysis and planning. Some, however, think that the present "mix" of personnel skills is not in proper balance. Those individuals feel that there are still too few ADP-oriented systems analysts and too many functional specialists and junior programmers assigned to the SIPS Task Force.

22. A number of the DDS detailees to SIPS display a keen interest in the potentialities of ADP, like the type of work they are doing, and feel that the skills and experience they are acquiring as members of the SIPS Task Group will enhance their value to their parent Career Service and increase their opportunities for career advancement. There is a low morale among other DDS detailees, however. These individuals feel estranged from their parent Career Services and think they are not in the mainstream of consideration for promotions.

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and reassignment opportunities. They have all been assured that they are considered along with all others of their service for promotion and reassignment, and it has been pointed out to them that a number of SIPS detailees have been promoted. Some of them, however, remain unconvinced and feel "trapped" in a situation they cannot get out of until the SIPS task objectives are completed, and some are still doubtful that the tasks will be completed as scheduled. A number of them, detailed to what they thought would be a one- to two-year assignment, have been working on the SIPS Program for four or five years and are depressed and discouraged by the prospect that they may have to spend two or three more years on work for which they do not feel particularly well suited or qualified. There is no easy solution to this difficult problem. The feeling that they are "trapped" tends to lower the efficiency and productivity of these employees. On the other hand, any large-scale rotation of the SIPS Group would have a serious adverse effect on the Program by requiring the training of replacements.

Recommendation No. 3

That the Director of the SIPS Task Force and the heads of the DDS Career Services concerned arrange for counseling with each DDS detailee with a view to assuring the best possible long-range utilization of the individual, both from his standpoint and that of the Agency.

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DD/S 70-2271

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications  
Director of Finance  
Director of Logistics  
Director of Medical Services  
Director of Personnel  
Director of Security

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Survey of the Office  
of Computer Services

1. Attached is an extract from subject survey concerning Recommendation No. 3:

"That the Director of the SIPS Task Force and the heads of the DDS Career Services concerned arrange for counseling with each DDS detailee with a view to assuring the best possible long-range utilization of the individual, both from his standpoint and that of the Agency. "


2. Prior to any counseling sessions with your careerists, concerning which we will be in further communication, I would appreciate your advising by 1 July the manner in which you are handling your careerists who are assigned to the SIPS Task Force - frequency and level of contact, career counseling and planning with them, competitive promotion discussions, continuing identification with parent office/career service, etc. I expect to be discussing SIPS more broadly with you in the context of this IG Survey in the immediate future.

3. The Executive Director-Comptroller has requested a reply on this recommendation by mid-July.

R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

Attachment

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DD/S 70-2272

18 JUN 1970

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics**

**SUBJECT : Inspector General's Survey of the Office  
of Computer Services**

1. Attached is an extract from subject survey concerning Recommendation No. 13:

"That the DDS arrange for a thorough study of OCS space needs and, upon completion, take whatever action possible to satisfy the needs."

Please review the OCS situation, identify significant deficiencies and suggest possible solutions.

2. The Executive Director-Comptroller has requested a reply from DDS on this recommendation by mid-July.

SIGNED R. L. Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

**Attachment**

X1 SOS-DD/S: [ ] ng (2 June 70)

X1 Retyped: SOS-DD/S: [ ] (15 June 70)

**Distribution:**

Orig - Addressee w/xerox Att.

1 - DD/S Subject w/Att.

1 - DD/S Chrono w/o Att.

1 - SOS Chrono w/Att.

1 - Chief, SSS, w/Att.

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S E C R E T

H. Space

1. We believe OCS has a space problem. It occupies [ ] square feet, all but 613 square feet in the headquarters building. Available employee office space equates to [ ] square feet per person. The headquarters average is [ ] square feet per person. The State Department, in comparison, averages 178; the Pentagon 115. The overall Agency average is [ ] square feet. In our judgment, the [ ] square foot figure is poor, even after considering the overall Agency space problem.

2. Our concern is heightened when we consider both the nature of the OCS work and the type of people we must recruit and hold if we are to do this highly technical work. Sufficient privacy is required to permit a high order of concentration, especially in the applications divisions and the Technical Staff of the Operations Division. Properly partitioned space seems basic to fulfilling this requirement. The interdependence of ADP work also makes a contiguous working area desirable though not mandatory. OCS is now occupying various areas of the ground floor, the first floor, and the second floor. We believe the Training Staff also needs additional area.

[ ] of the Operations Division and some sections of Management Support Division need a neater, more pleasant working environment.

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3. The technical people that carry out our ADP efforts are highly trained and skilled specialists. Competition for their services is intense. However, OCS has been able to hire these people, but holding them has been more difficult. We believe that OCS would hold more than they do if the Office working environment could be expanded and improved.

4. The OCS management is fully aware of the space problem and has struggled toward a solution. The Office managers are concerned about rearranging, cleaning, and brightening up their work areas, and taking steps to cut down on the noise level. In our judgment, however, more remains to be done.

Recommendation No. 13

That DDS arrange for a thorough study of OCS space needs and, upon completion, take whatever action possible to satisfy the needs.

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DD/S 70-2273

18 JUN 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Survey of the Office  
of Computer Services

1. Attached is an extract from subject survey concerning Recommendation No. 9:

"That OCS and OS review their ADP security manpower requirements and develop measures to insure the secure, compartmented use of the OCS time-sharing 360/67 system both for CIA internal needs and for potential COINS applications."

2. The Executive Director-Comptroller has requested a reply from DDS on this recommendation by mid-July. I recognize that this is a complex problem and would appreciate your discussing it with me or A-DD/S after you have studied the attached and preliminarily reviewed it with OCS - prior to 1 July. We can then decide what further action is to be taken to enable me to respond appropriately to Ex. Dir. -Comptroller.

SIGNED R. L. Bannerman

R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

Attachment

SOS-DD/S [ ] g (2 June 70)  
Retyped: SOS-DD/S:JRP:ng (15 June 70)  
Distribution:

- Orig - Addressee w/xerox Att.
- 1 - DD/S Subject w/Att.
- 1 - DD/S Chrono w/o Att.
- 1 - SOS Chrono w/Att.
- 1 - Chief, SSS, w/Att.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

[ 3. The security constraints associated with the use of ADP may well be the key factor in determining how fast and how far the Agency can go in utilizing computerized inhouse and community-wide interactive and/or time-sharing information systems. More in-depth analysis is needed to clearly identify the degree of vulnerability and risk involved, and to devise and test the controls required in establishing acceptable security standards. The skills required for such studies and experiments are in short supply, and unless this task is accorded a high priority, the benefits contemplated from time-sharing interactive services will most likely have to be deferred pending the solution of security problems. Some tough decisions lie ahead for top-level management in connection with balancing the traditional requirements for security compartmentation of information against the advantages which might accrue from ADP interactive time-sharing services if these requirements were relaxed. Agency management will need all the expert advice and assistance it can get on

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this problem.

4. In spite of the foregoing recognized need for expert security advice, rather than increasing the OS capability in the ADP field as we believe is necessary, a recent decision was made to reduce the number of security people working on ADP matters. We fear that this may be false economy. The Agency will most certainly need an increased number of highly qualified individuals in the field of ADP security.

5. OCS participates in the Community On-Line Intelligence System experiment (COINS), first proposed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). This system has many of the same security problems as those outlined above.

6. Officials in OCS believe that COINS would best meet PFIAB hopes if it were a time-sharing, multi-classification level system. Such a system would allow a user to query only those files for which he was cleared or had a need-to-know. It would eliminate the need for all users to have all clearances for all files in the system. The adoption of such a system would also fit with the OCS proposal for one central COINS computer rather than the many now employed.

7. The Security people, however, have problems with such a system. Two OCS officials told us that our Office of Security believes that there is no way to make a COINS time-sharing system secure but that OS has not put their reasons in writing. OCS also expressed

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concern about the limited amount of effort OS was giving the time-sharing security problem. The OCS officials are convinced that a time-sharing multi-clearance level COINS can be made secure and seemed disturbed about what they viewed as an intransigent position on the part of OS. The OS officer responsible for Agency ADP security was then interviewed to determine if a true impasse existed.

8. The OS ADP officer, who is also Chairman of the ADP Security Subcommittee of the UNIB Security Committee, confirmed the OCS view that Security believes time-sharing with the IBM 360/67 with multi-clearance level files has security problems. At the present time there are about 50 remote terminals tied to our Agency time-sharing 360/67. A great many people have access to the 50 terminals. More people have access to the computer and the files in OCS. If a 360/67 such as ours were then the one central computer for COINS, possibly thousands more would have access to the files. More thousands of people would be added if DIA ties the Unified and Specified Commands to COINS as they have proposed. Unlike the "old days" wherein Security concentrated on people and the files they kept in a few safe drawers, OS believes it is now faced with a problem over which it could lose all security control.

9. OS believes that the advent of the first ADP-based files multiplied the potential for spillage, tampering, and penetration of intelligence information. In their view, time-sharing has made the

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problem many, many times worse. OS then raises the question of the degree of security we can now accept with time-sharing and how this degree of security is to be established.

10. OS believes certain steps must be taken to establish the degree of security that is acceptable with the 360/67. These are as follows:

- a. Determine the security features in the ADP system.
- b. Determine the security flaws in the system.
- c. Test the system with a controlled experiment.

Each step has sub-steps. For example, in item b., Security would want to study the hardware for flaws. The executive software that controls the hardware would also have to be studied for flaws. They would also have to look at the individual job programs, the access control, the case of penetration, etc.

11. OS feels that these three steps would then give them a "ball park" understanding of the system's security. OS does not now have the capability to do even this basic job. With this in mind, it is understandable why they have not done more with OCS to work out the security problems of a COINS multi-clearance, multi-access time-sharing system.

12. OS believes that the basic manpower requirement to do the "ball park" study outlined above would take a six-man group. The group would include two computer hardware design specialists, two

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computer systems programmers, and two security people, at least one of whom would have ADP experience.

13. The complex ADP security problem is hitting OS at a time when they are being asked to cut back in manpower. There is then the question of where OS allocates its effort. From the OCS's view, more should be directed toward the time-sharing ADP security problem. In our judgment, the Agency has made a large commitment to time-sharing ADP as well as to the COINS experiment. We doubt that our commitments in these two areas will diminish or even hold steady. An expanded effort appears inevitable. The IG Audit Staff is now acquiring an ADP audit capability in recognition of the continuing and expanding audit requirements in this area. We believe the Office of Security must also give ADP an increasing amount of attention.

Recommendation No. 9

That OCS and OS review their ADP security manpower requirements and develop measures to insure the secure, compartmented use of the OCS time-sharing 360/67 system both for CIA internal needs and for potential COINS applications.

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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SECRET

DD/S 70-2271

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Communications  
Director of Finance  
Director of Logistics  
Director of Medical Services  
Director of Personnel  
Director of Security

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Survey of the Office  
of Computer Services

1. Attached is an extract from subject survey concerning Recommendation  
No. 3.

"That the Director of the SIPS Task Force and the heads  
of the DDS Career Services concerned arrange for counseling  
with each DDS detailee with a view to assuring the best possible  
long-range utilization of the individual, both from his stand-  
point and that of the Agency."

3. ~~2~~ The Executive Director-Comptroller has requested a reply on this  
recommendation by mid-July.

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Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP84-00780R003400080042-3

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DD/S 70-2272

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Logistics

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Survey of the Office  
of Computer Services

1. Attached is an extract from subject survey concerning

Recommendation No. 13:


That the DDS arrange for a thorough study of OCS  
space needs and, upon completion, take whatever action  
possible to satisfy the needs.

2. The Executive Director-Comptroller has requested a reply *from DDS*  
on this recommendation by mid-July.

R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

Attachment

SECRET



SECRET

DD/S 70-2273

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

SUBJECT : Inspector General's Survey of the Office  
of Computer Services

1. Attached is an extract from subject survey concerning Recommendation

No. 9:

That OCS and OS review their ADP security manpower requirements and develop measures to insure the secure, compartmented use of the OCS time-sharing 360/67 system both for CIA internal needs and for potential COINS applications.

2. The Executive Director-Comptroller has requested a reply *on this* from DDS

*on this* recommendation by mid-July.

*I recognize that this is a complex problem and would appreciate your discussing it with me or ADDS after you have studied the attached and preliminarily reviewed it with OCS - prior to 1 July. We can then decide what further action is to be taken to enable me to respond appropriately to Ed in Conf.*

R. L. Bannerman  
Deputy Director  
for Support

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**SECRET**

Executive Registry

70-2201/3

DD/S 70-2129

25 MAY 1970

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Support**

**SUBJECT : Inspector General's Survey of the  
Office of Computer Services**

You have received a copy of the subject report, which contains several recommendations addressed in whole or in part to you. I would appreciate a response on those recommendations by mid-July.

**L. K. White**

**L. K. White  
Executive Director-Comptroller**

**cc: DDS&T**

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification